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Government is relying increasingly on the market mechanism for economic 
management. The underlying perfect competition model assures maximum welfare of 
consumer, but assumptions of the model do not hold in real world. Consumer is central to 
economic activity but at the same time is vulnerable to exploitation by producers, misleading 
information, ignorance of his rights and non-availability of redress mechanism. Markets may 
be competitive but the consumers may suffer on account  of imperfect information, search and 
transport costs needed to make satisfactory choices. This creates the need for government 
intervention for protecting the consumer welfare and rights. This paper explains why a 
consumer protection policy is needed in a situation of ‘competitive’ markets and looks into 
consumer protection strategies followed in some other countries. The area of consumer 
protection in Pakistan has remained neglected so far and no meaningful effort has been made 
in this direction. Realising  this gap, the paper chalks out a consumer protection strategy for 
Pakistan; which goes beyond mere formulation of legislation and also includes consistent 
efforts towards awareness creation, provision of information/advice, setting of quality 
standards and redress. In the long run the efforts should continue in the from of research, 
formation/strengthening of consumer pressure groups and regional cooperation. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Increased reliance is being placed on forces of competition as a factor in 
economic management. This paper explores why a consumer protection policy is needed 
in a situation of ostensibly competitive market and presents consumer protection 
strategies followed in some countries. It also sets out a consumer protection strategy for 
Pakistan. The basic aims and objectives of the consumer protection exercise are spelled 
out. Future policy requirements, both short-term and long-term, in protecting consumers 
are identified. 
The paper is divided into four sections. Section I provides a discussion on the 
theoretical background covering relevant aspect of the perfect competition model, the 
failure of which gives rise to issues of consumer protection. The model is a useful 
thinking device but differs from actual consumer experience. Competition purportedly 
maximises consumer welfare, the markets may be ‘competitive’ but the consumers may 
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suffer on account of instances of market failure, e.g., imperfect information and search 
and transport costs in making satisfactory choices. Consumers thus need effective ways 
to redress the situation so that signals are sent back to the suppliers for providing the 
desired goods or services; signals that market failure may deny. Market failure creates 
the need for government intervention for protecting the consumers’ welfare, as 
envisaged in principle in the perfect competition model. In this manner the paper 
examines the implications for the consumer of relaxing the assumptions of the perfect 
competition model. 
Section II gives the experiences of some other countries in the area of consumer 
protection, which covers efforts made at the governmental level by the respective 
consumer protection authorities. Section III discusses the efforts made by Pakistan thus 
far; these include the present Islamabad Act on Consumer Protection. The section 
discusses the salient features of Islamabad Consumer Protection Act. Section IV, the last 
section gives policy recommendations, delineating short-term and long-term measures. 
 
I.  THE PERFECT COMPETITION MODEL AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CONSUMER 
A market is said to be perfectly competitive, where (1) there are large number of 
independent sellers of a homogenous product, (2) an individual seller has no control 
over the price of the commodity as he sells a negligible portion of total output, and (3) 
the individual seller assumes the role of a price taker and sells his output at the prevailing 
market price and he may sell any quantity. The main assumptions and implications of 
perfect competition are as follows: 
 (a) Large number of buyers and sellers of an individual commodity, such that no 
single agent is in a position to dictate the terms based on either supply or 
demand. 
 (b) Homogeneous goods and perfect substitutability of the products which implies 
that consumers’ preference is same for the output from all firms. 
 (c) Profit maximisation. In a perfectly competitive market a firm maximises its 
profit with reference to a given market price, established by the forces of 
demand and supply. 
 (d) Perfect knowledge on the part of buyers regarding price charged by any firm. 
Similarly, every producer is aware of the common production techniques of all 
other producers in the  industry. The producer also has perfect knowledge 
regarding the taste (and changes in the taste) of the buyers. This is possible in a 
situation where there are no information costs. 
 (e) There are no transport costs  or time costs  for both the buyers and sellers. 
 (f) The businessmen have no power. 
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 (g) Base of entry and exit; the firms in a competitive market can easily enter or 
leave the industry in response to the economic forces. 
 (h) Perfect factor mobility and divisibility, the factors of production are perfectly 
mobile and divisible in a competitive model, there are no artificial restrictions 
on the prices or on the movement of factors. The resources are shiftable and 
mobile. 
Consumers’ interest are automatically taken care of under perfect competition. In 
terms of prices this comes from the fact that no seller can charge a price higher than that 
prevailing in the market. In addition, the products are homogeneous, hence in terms of 
quality, consumers’ demand is satisfied by any firm’s product. There are no costs related 
to transportation, information and time consumption. The buyer has a perfect knowledge 
of the market and his welfare is thus maximised. 
Actual experience, however, presents a sharp contrast to this over simplified 
model. There are transport costs, knowledge imperfections, restrictions on the mobility 
of factors of production, barriers to entry and products are not homogeneous or perfect 
substitutes. Product differentiation is one of the important characteristics of imperfect 
competition. Products are differentiated by natural causes as well as man-made elements. 
Each firm tries to differentiate its product from the others by advertising, propaganda, 
attractive packaging, patents, etc. to have a monopolist-like position for the differentiated 
product. 
In the absence of perfect competition, prices are influenced by producer/seller 
individually, or acting in a cartel, which could result in exploitation of the consumer. 
Another deviation from perfect competition is the exercise of monopoly power. 
Monopoly power implies the ability of one or few sellers to have control over the supply 
or price of the product. The market share of a firm determines its degree of dominance. 
Existence of a single firm leads to pure monopoly. In an oligopolistic setup, one or more 
firms may be monopolistic. 
Monopolistic actions ultimately result in the exploitation of the consumers. The 
consumers may have to pay a higher price than in case of competition. Due to increased 
price some consumers cannot use the product because of their limited purchasing power. 
Secondly, if the monopolist restricts output in case of commodities having inelastic 
demand then all possible users may not get the product. Thirdly, if the demand elasticity 
of a product does not allow a price increase, the producer may opt to compromise 
quality, hence consumers get a sub-standard product. This is why monopolistic practices 
are considered detrimental to the public interest. 
The imperfections of the market call for some mechanism to protect the interests 
of consumers; competition and consumer protection authorities fulfil this task. 
Competition could be brought about by lessening the barriers to entry, effective 
distribution channels, and by controlling unreasonable monopoly power. Different  
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legislations such as those relating  to standardisation, packaging and branding, food 
adulteration, hoarding, etc., address the well-being of consumers and, at a conceptual 
level, cater to the inadequacies of the perfect competition model. Such laws, in fact, 
prove to be insufficient for the purpose of providing redress to the consumers as the 
procedures are complex, cumbersome and time consuming, while the remedies are 
limited in scope. Against this background, the consumer protection authority (CPA) 
serves as a regulator and sometimes also acts as an arbitrator. Its aim is to protect 
consumer welfare, firstly, by the provision of correct and adequate information to the 
consumer, at the right time. Secondly, The CPA could intervene in the redress process 
by making such processes accessible, speedy and effective. In cases of extreme violation 
of standards such as in terms of quality, the supplier/producer could be made to quit the 
market and in other less severe cases fines/punishments could also be used. 
Some of the problems faced by the consumers and the corresponding action of 
the CPA is explained below with the help of diagrams. Six hypothetical situations of 
monopoly, monopolistic competition, product differentiation, time and distance related 
costs, and imperfect knowledge about prices on the part of consumers are explored to 
see the impact of actions by a CPA. 
Figure 1 shows the case, where the monopolist charges a higher price in the 
absence of CPA, i.e., OP. The action by CPA and consumer pressure groups create 
awareness by publicising the unreasonable practice of monopolist, which pushes down 
the demand curve of the product on the one hand and forces the monopolist to reduce the 
unreasonable price on the other. The profit margins, are thus reduced after CPA 
intervention, from P``PKL to P``P`MN. In Figure 2 the monopolist is bound by the 
consumer pressure groups, to reduce price to OP`; at a level where marginal cost equates 
average cost. 
Figure 3 shows that under situation of monopolistic competition, the CPA would 
not allow the seller to reap unreasonable profit i.e., PP` LM. Hence, the reduced price 
OP` will force seller to sell more i.e. OQ` in order to maximise his profit. 
In situations of imperfect competition, the producer spends heavily on advertising to 
differentiate the product from that of the competitors’. In Figure 4 below the supply curve 
shifts to S` due to capacity utilisation and the demand curve shifts to D` as a response to 
advertising effort to differentiate the product. Hence, at the same price P the producer is 
able to sell more that is, OQ` instead of OQ. With the intervention of the CPA, consumers 
are made aware of minor differentiation; the producer can still sell more i.e. OQ`` but at a 
relatively lower price i.e. OP`, and a lower level of quantity than before. 
Figure 5 reflects a situation where a commodity is sold at different prices within 
the same city. The distance, time and transportation costs force a buyer at point “a” to 
buy an item at a higher price i.e. P instead of going to the point “d” and getting the same 
product  at a  cheaper  price i.e. P`. The  CPA  makes known the price differentials. As a  
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It is clear from Figure 6 that due to imperfect knowledge on the part of buyers, 
the sellers are able to charge different prices. This situation can no longer be maintained 
if they are well informed of market situations. The result would be a decline in the prices 
in the market A and an increase in the price at market B i.e., P`. 
Apart from Figures 1 and 2, others reflect issues arising  due to non-
availability/inadequate information. This information gap is filled by CPA. 
 
II. EXPERIENCE OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE 
AREA OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 
To protect the consumers, different countries (the respective laws of Australia, 
Germany, India, Sri Lanka and United Kingdom were studied) have adopted different 
measures, which primarily aim at provision of information and redress mechanisms 
alongwith improving prospects of competition and efficiency. The respective 
competition and consumer protection authorities are playing an important role in this 
respect.1 
The main objective of the authorities in the 6 countries is to protect and promote 
consumer rights which include, firstly, the right to be informed about the quality, 
quantity, potency, purity, standard and price of the goods. In this regard, the Office of 
Fair Trading (OFT) in UK provides several consumer advice publications. These 
include: Your shopping rights, Prepayments, Buying a service, Using an Estate Agent to 
Buy or Sell Your Home, etc. to educate the consumers about their rights. In Sri Lanka, 
the Department of Internal Trade (DIT) issues “Directions” for labelling, price marking, 
packeting, etc., or special directions may be given for manufacturing, marketing or sale 
of articles. In Germany, 250 regional centres are working to provide consumers with 
advice and information. Secondly, the right of the consumers to be protected from 
hazardous goods. For instance, in Germany, the Stiftung Warentest tests all the products 
with a wide range e.g., ball-point pens to the personal computers. Products are tested for 
their quality, value for money and compatibility with the environment (services are also 
tested). Warentest call upon only independent experts and institutions. Due to its 
independent opinion it has gained a good reputation both from the consumers and 
producers, it gives producers an advertising advantage as being approved by the 
Warentest. Thirdly, consumers have the right of redress. In Australia, for instance, the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), may sue a manufacturer 
for defective goods on behalf of one or more persons who have suffered loss, providing 
those persons give written consent for the ACCC to act on their behalf. The consumers 
1Although the purpose of this paper is not to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the consumer 
protection work of the authorities in the respective  countries. However, as a brief reference some of the 
problems faced by the authorities include, lack of uniformity in the procedures in different organisations dealing 
with consumer protection within the country, lack of financial and human resources to detect misleading 
conduct, false representation, anti-competitive practices, etc. 
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are  entitled to compensation if the goods they buy are not of merchantable quality, are 
not fit for their purpose, do not match the description or sample, have defects, the spare 
parts and repairs for the product are not available, etc. The consumers are entitled to 
complain and procure redress. The redress guidelines by DIT in Sri Lanka, provide that 
if the fault is in no way connected with the customers own mishandling of an article, it 
will be immediately returned to the trader, as any undue delay may cause problems 
pertaining to liability. The customers are required to retain all relevant documents 
whenever an article is purchased and may request redress which can take the form of 
repairs, replacements, refund of cash, compensation, etc. The consumer has the right to 
complain directly to the Consumer Redress Division of the DIT. In India, quasi-judicial 
bodies at district, state and national level are set up under Consumer Protection Act 
(COPRA) for speedy compensation of consumer’s complaints. These bodies have 
powers of a civil court to facilitate the availability of necessary documents and 
examination under oath. The District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forums (DCDRFs) 
have a pecuniary jurisdiction of Rs 5 lakh. and the State Commissions has Rs 20 lakhs 
limit. In case exceeds the compensation amount accedes Rs 20 lakhs the consumer has to 
apply to the National Commission.2 The decisions of the authority are however subject 
to appellate and revision jurisdictions. 
Last but not least, the consumers have the right to being  educated. This is 
necessary due to the ever increasing number of new products in the market. This variety 
and increased choice creates problems for the consumers to judge the quality of 
products, dishonest sales methods or dangers to health. In Germany, the  results of tests 
are publicised by the Warentest in its monthly publications ‘test’ and ‘FINANZ - Test’, 
which have a circulation of about a million. The results are also regularly publicised in 
160 newspapers and periodicals, and on radio and television. 
From the above discussion, it can be summarised that the thrust of the effort of 
competition and consumer protection authorities is to adequately inform the consumers 
and promote conditions of competitiveness. However, the economic, social and legal 
environment differs across countries and  an effective policy in one country may not 
prove equally effective in another. 
 
III. EFFORTS MADE BY PAKISTAN FOR 
CONSUMER PROTECTION 
 
Islamabad Consumer Protection Act 
The policies of the Government of Pakistan regarding economic liberalisation, 
deregulation and privatisation and the subsequent expansion of the private sector rely on 
2Country papers of Sri Lanka and India on ‘Socio-economic Implications of the World Trade 
Agreement of South Asian Countries’. September 11-12, 1995. Regional Seminar, Bangladesh, organised by 
Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Islamabad. 
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the efficient working of market processes and also improvement/promotion of such 
processes. It is natural therefore to provide a regulatory framework that addresses the 
issues arising from likely market failures. This has led to the need for enacting 
appropriate legislation to safeguard the interests of the consumers. Indeed, under Article 
18 of the Constitution, it is the duty of the state to regulate trade, commerce or industry 
in the interest of free competition. To protect the rights of the consumers in situations of 
inadequate information, impediments in competitive behaviour in the markets, the 
Federal Government enacted the Islamabad Consumer Protection Act on October 18, 
1995. This law incorporates definitions of unfair trade practices as well as provides for a 
mechanism for handling consumer complaints. 
The definition of unfair trade practice aims to identify situations where either 
insufficient, misleading or false information in respect of the product has been provided 
to the consumer. The examples are any false information/advertisement regarding 
quality, quantity, grade, composition, style or mode, or rebuilt, reconditioned or old 
goods shown as new goods, false warranty or guarantee of performance, facilities 
available in the private educational institutions, professional services, etc. Furthermore 
situations restrictive of competitive behaviour such as hoarding and black-marketing are 
also defined as unfair trade practices. Safety concerns are also addressed and trade 
practices that cause loss or injury through adulteration, selling of expired drugs, food 
items and commodities unfit for human consumption are also defined as unfair. Finally, 
charging for goods and services in excess of the prices fixed by an authority authorised 
to do so, is prohibited under the legislation. 
The mechanism for handling consumer complaints works as follows. The law 
provides for a Consumer Protection Council in Islamabad which will consist of 
prominent citizens involved in social work as well as legislators and government 
officials. The main purpose of the Council shall be to inform the consumers about their 
rights. Also the purpose includes to determine, promote, protect and formulate policies 
for the interests of the consumers against marketing of hazardous goods, variety of 
goods/substitutes at competitive prices, compensation against unfair trade practices of 
unscrupulous exploitation of consumers, easy availability of essential services and right 
of information about the quality, quantity, purity, standard and price of goods and 
services. To ensure this the Council shall coordinate between the Government, 
manufacturers, producers, suppliers and consumers. To adjudicate disputes the law sets 
up an Authority which according to the Islamabad Act shall be the Court of Sessions. 
The Council or the consumer can file a complaint to the Authority against any unfair 
trade practice. If the Authority observes that the rights of the consumers have been 
infringed, it shall first provide the opportunity of being heard to the relevant parties. If 
the rights of the consumers are found to be violated, the Authority may punish the 
person responsible with imprisonment which may extend to two years or with fine 
which may extend to forty thousand rupees, or with both. Similar punishment may be 
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given to a person responsible for false or misleading advertisement. The Authority may 
order for payment of compensation to the consumer to the extent the consumer has 
suffered any damage or loss through any unfair trade practice. The Authority can also 
order for confiscation of the goods or direct for their destruction.3 
The present consumer protection law is only for the Federal Capital. Consumer 
protection being a provincial subject the provinces are also in the process of formulating 
legislation for their respective provinces, Islamabad Consumer Protection Act is being 
used as a model law for this purpose.4 
 
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The first step in this respect is the precise categorisation of the tasks which may 
fall within the consumer protection work, and the definition of the overall boundaries of 
such work, is of utmost importance. This certainly is not a straightforward thing to start 
with. In the short term, effective enforcement and execution involves five tasks. 
First is the need for appropriate legislation for consumer protection. Appropriate 
legislation for consumer protection should be enforced in the whole country. It should 
cater to the  peculiarities of the market situations. The legislation should aim at reducing 
information gaps, providing advice and redress to the best of consumer interests. At the 
same time there is a need to create awareness amongst the consumers and to inform them 
of their rights. 
Secondly, raising general awareness at both government as well as general public 
level is necessary. Government should be conscious of the fact that protecting the rights 
of the consumers is essential for promoting efficient and effective competition in the 
country. The Islamabad Consumer Protection Act is the first step in this direction and its 
extension to the provinces will prove to be a bigger challenge. General public on the 
other hand, being consumers, should be made aware of their rights. Tripartite seminars, 
having participation from consumers, industry and the government with involvement of 
mass media could be used for this purpose. Publicity campaigns by the consumer 
associations and NGOs can also prove helpful in this regard. 
3Some important issues which need attention, once the law is operational are: firstly, suitable 
laboratories for testing the quality of the products, secondly, registration of consumer protection associations, 
thirdly, time-frame to be specified within which a complaint can be filed so that consumer do not misuse the law, 
fourthly, frivolous complaints should be disposed of at the earliest possible stage to minimise costs, fifthly, 
instead of confining the law to prosecution only, there should be provision for replacement or removal of defect 
in a product, last but not least, the law should also cover the issues of environment protection. Moreover, the UN 
Guidelines for Consumer Protection, 1985, can also be used as a checklist against which the effectiveness of 
policies can be measured. 
4Shamim A. Rizvi, “MCA: The Consumer-friendly dragon awakens!” Pakistan and Gulf Economist, 
August 3–9, 1996. pp. 38–41. 
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Thirdly, is the issue of adequate information and advice in more specific terms. 
Information can serve as an effective tool for consumer protection in many ways; firstly, 
well informed consumers would be in a better position to protect themselves against 
exploitation; secondly, even in case  of problems, they would be able to resolve by 
themselves; thirdly, where they are unable to do so, they will be able to get assistance 
from others. This should be the essential element of any consumer protection agenda. A 
wide range of small, attractive and precise booklets having facts about goods and 
services should  be provided at convenient places to inform the consumers. 
Guidance and advice should be provided to consumers on individual case bases 
in response to telephonic/written queries. Regulation on information should be 
formulated to outlaw misleading information about products. It may be by means of 
legislation e.g., on trade descriptions and misleading advertisement as well as 
prescribing what should be revealed in the interest of consumers. Improved disclosure of 
information may be used as a remedy for situations of consumer impairment. 
Fourthly, there is the need to lay down quality standards to provide minimum 
specifications for goods and services to be sold. Quality, used in a wider meaning, may 
cover weights and measures legislation, safety regulation, some other measures which 
may be product specific e.g., food hygiene, etc. The objective behind this task is to 
impart a sense of confidence to the consumer in making choices. However, it should be 
assured that quality standards and procedures required thereof are maintained with least 
burden on suppliers/producers. Producers and traders should also be advised by the CPA 
regarding their benefits in complying with the quality and information standards. This 
would help reduce difficulties at both consumers’ and producers’ end. 
Fifthly, it is important to secure speedy redress; this should be provided through 
courts such as small claim courts, session courts, ombudsman and other self regulatory 
mechanisms e.g., guarantees and arbitration schemes. The objective is to encourage 
more effective and accessible redress channels for all, which may be used when other 
measures for consumer protection might not impede consumer exploitation. 
In the long-term there is need to create an appropriate environment for execution 
and enforcement. There are five aspects: First, research on other countries legislations by 
the academicians and other consumer representative bodies (e.g., consumer NGOs) into 
the matters related to consumer protection should be conducted on continuous basis. The 
procedures/processes followed in other countries while dealing with cases of consumer 
protection and the ways to effectively use/accommodate them in Pakistan’s legislation 
should be analysed. The results of research and investigations into areas of consumer 
concern, identification of core issues on specific sectors/trading practices, with 
recommendations should be directed to industry/government. The results should also be 
publicised for the benefit and knowledge of general consumers. 
Formation of and lobbying by consumer pressure groups is the next task. The 
groups should pursue recommendations derived both through actual experiences and 
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research work for changes in the  existing practices adversely affecting interest of the 
consumers. This may be in the shape of providing policy inputs and representations. The 
existence of such groups in an effective capacity would go a long way in strengthening 
the consumer’s position.5 Producers involved in malpractices will fear the negative 
publicity that the consumer pressure groups may give about their product or company 
and thus may resort to fair trade. The task of the Consumer Protection Agencies would 
be considerably lessened. 
Third is the formulation/revision of policy and legislation, essentially to be done 
by the Government by way of policy-making. Time to time revision of legislation should 
be done in light of results of research and recommendations by the consumer groups. 
Public interest groups should be consulted and briefed at every stage of legislative 
changes. This will help in receiving appropriate inputs from the consumers regarding the 
necessary changes and in keeping active involvement of the public. The efforts should 
be towards development of an integrated consumer protection policy such that different 
branches of the government maintain appropriate consumer dimension while taking any 
step or decision which will affect consumers. 
Fourthly, coordination should be assured among CPA, Council and consumer 
organisations/groups and their roles/functions be clearly defined. Otherwise the 
possibility of overlaps in efforts, or gaps in coverage, may arise. 
Fifthly, regional cooperation among SAARC/ASEAN countries could be 
developed in the  form of setting up an International/Regional Supervision Network. 
This Network could help  in dealing with cross-border consumer complaints and 
inquiries can be referred to the appropriate authorities in other countries through the 
auspices of the Network. In addition, it would help Pakistan to benefit from the 
experiences of other countries. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The perfect competition model differs from the actual experience of the 
consumers. This is due to the fact that the assumptions of the model e.g., perfect 
knowledge, zero cost, etc., are not valid in the real world. The information and 
awareness gaps on the part of consumers while making choices and misleading/false 
information provided by the producers necessitates the need for CPA. The paper 
explains the need for CPA in terms of the analysis of market structure models. CPA 
serves as an intermediary and as an arbitrator in different countries of the world. 
Experiences of Germany, UK, Australia, Sri Lanka and India are discussed briefly as in 
Pakistan the efforts towards consumer protection have remained limited thus far. 
5Some consumers’ groups active in Pakistan include Network Association for the Rational Use of 
Medicine, Lahore-based Consumer Watch, Saarif Mahaz and Punjab Lok Sujag. However, these groups have a 
low profile and their activities have not generated the momentum needed to start a broad level consumer 
movement. 
A Strategy for Consumer Protection 
 
 
1015 
A strategy for consumer protection in Pakistan would involve firstly, an 
appropriate legislation for consumer protection for the entire country. However any 
formulation of legislation per se is not sufficient without assuring its effective 
implementation. For instance, Islamabad Consumer Protection Act has been enacted for 
a year now but still the Consumer Protection Council has not been formed nor has the 
Law been given proper publicity and even the consumers of Islamabad are unaware of 
this Law. Among other components of strategy are, awareness creation, provision of 
information/advice, setting of quality standards and provision of speedy redress, in the 
short run. The long term tasks world include research, formation of consumer pressure 
groups and regional cooperation in the area of consumer protection. 
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Comments 
 
The paper by Khan and Mansoor on “A Strategy for Consumer Protection in 
Pakistan” courageously addresses an important and emerging issue of consumer 
protection in Pakistan’s goods market. It documents the role of consumer protection 
agencies in some developed or neighbouring developing countries. There  can be no 
doubt that countries like Pakistan can learn from the experience of advanced 
industrialised countries in their consumer protection strategies. The information about 
the quality of products, maintenance of standards and redress mechanism can go a long 
way in protecting the genuine interests of the consuming public. However, this argument 
cannot be used to justify undue intervention of government regulatory agencies. In this 
era of deregulating economies, one should be careful in proposing new regulations. 
Although, consumer protection strategies aim at protecting people, yet producers are 
people too. To maximise overall welfare of society only economic theory and policy 
should serve as a guide. Therefore, it is desirable that the consumer protection agency 
should not be driven simply by rhetoric or casual empiricism. 
In this perspective, let me acknowledge that I have found this paper interesting 
and informative. Drawing heavily on the figures in Section 1, the authors propose a 
consumer protection policy for Pakistan. The question remains, however, as to whether 
their conclusions are vested in standard economic theory and policy. Therefore, my 
comments below mainly focus on the theoretical consistency of the framework 
underlying their figures. 
• In Figures 1 and 2, the authors claim that the consumer protection agency’s 
(CPA) action and consumer pressure will force the monopolist to adopt average 
cost pricing rule as in Figure 2. The authors may want to elaborate on the 
mechanism how this system works and why? 
• In Figure 3, the CPA not only forces average cost pricing (as in Figure 2) but 
also forces the seller to sell more, i.e.,  from OQ to OQ`. One can ask how the 
CPA may force producers of differentiated products (who sell thousands of 
products with different brand names) to charge average  cost pricing. A more 
serious problem seems to be that the producers are selling where AC>P. It 
implies, in other words, that the CPA would force otherwise profit maximising 
producers to assume the role of inefficient and irrational profit minimisers. 
• In Figure 4, the authors assert that advertising and capacity utilisation will shift 
demand and supply curves. However, it is unclear to me why the demand curve 
is kinked. If product differentiation through advertising gives price control to 
producers then the demand curve should be negatively sloped. Moreover, in 
advertising costs the distinction should be made between constructive 
(informative) and combative advertising because they have different 
A Strategy for Consumer Protection 
 
 
1017
implications on the direction of shift in demand curve. For example, 
constructive advertising may increase demand and therefore shift demand curve 
to its right. However, combative advertising merely reflects competition among 
different brands for a share in the fixed market. Consequently, combative 
advertisement is defensive in nature. Firms are sometimes forced to use 
combative advertisement to avoid losing market share since their rival firms are 
doing so. Therefore, combative advertising may increase or decrease the market 
share of an individual firm. Should the supply curve shift to its right as depicted 
in Figure 4? We know from economic theory that output supply is a function of 
output and input prices or y (P,w,v). If supply curve shifts in response to 
advertising cost it should shift to its left instead of right as in the figure. 
Capacity utilisation is a factor which can shift supply curve to its right but it 
depends on the economies of scale. Even if capacity utilisation is recognised as 
a shift factor it may require overtime to workers at higher than normal rates. If it 
is so, even then the supply should shift to its left. 
• The truth to the matter is that advertisement cost and overtime will shift the 
supply curve to its left while capacity utilisation or economies of scale may 
push supply curve to shift to right. The net effect may be ambiguous and may 
vary from one industry to another.  
• In Figure 5, the authors explain a situation when a commodity receives different 
prices within the same city. Which market structure is assumed and how supply 
interacts with demand in this figure is not clear from the paper. I understand 
that price variation in different markets in the same city may be explained by 
different rents of shops or transport cost to sellers, which shift supply to its left 
or right. 
Besides, there are several inconsistencies in the paper that needs to be dealt with. 
To quote just one example, in the second  paragraph of the paper the authors note that 
“the markets may be competitive but the consumers may suffer on account of instances 
of market failure”. My question is: If market fails, can we really call that market 
perfectly competitive? 
I sincerely feel that the authors can make a case for consumer protection and 
welfare by discussing the dead weight loss associated with monopoly market structure. 
They should discuss the role of CPA for the cases of natural monopolies such as utility 
companies and should also comment on how we can make use of the information on 
consumer demand elasticities? 
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